WARDRAIL AI ROUTER & GOVERNANCE
Windows desktop · v4.0.1

Local first for meaning,
cloud last for residual inference.

Wardrail routes every prompt across a Mixture-of-Models pool — local open-weight GGUF, on-device NPU, and cloud APIs — on task type, prompt size, policy and cost budget instead of a standing choice of the most expensive provider. Safety, locality and minimisation are all decided on the device, before anything may leave it.

Wardrail — AI Router & Governance
9
Pipeline stages, fixed order
6
Deployment scenarios
4
RBAC roles under SSO
12 mo
Identity-audit retention
01 — What the product commits to

Sovereignty, privacy and cost, decided before egress

The decisions with ethical weight are taken before anything leaves the device — and the boundaries of those decisions are written down rather than discovered in production.

01

Locality is decided before egress

Prompt safety, complexity scoring, pool filtering and Sensitive Sources screening all run before dispatch — and screening applies to the composed egress payload, so tool output or file content injected into context cannot bypass the locality check.

02

Minimisation before the cloud, not after

Cloud Privacy Hardening minimises the cloud-facing artifact locally through a persistent pseudonym vault, configurable identifier detection and conversation compartmentalisation. Three artifacts stay distinct: original prompt, composed payload, and what actually leaves.

03

Data at rest under one key you hold

Optional at-rest encryption seals conversations, settings, the vault, the Sensitive Sources index, logs and telemetry as AES-256-GCM envelopes. Windows Hello gates the DPAPI unwrap and decrypts nothing itself; the Master Key is machine-bound and never leaves the process.

04

Separation, roles and an audit trail

Named workspaces keep conversations, vault, sources, telemetry and logs from cross-contaminating on one machine. With sign-in enabled, four roles govern in-app actions and the identity audit carries automated twelve-month retention with calendar-month rotation.

05

An internal-network posture, by construction

Wardrail is explicitly not a public-internet server product. The Server bind is loopback-enforced, worker listeners default to loopback and may take an explicit LAN address, and binding to all interfaces is rejected outright rather than discouraged.

06

Cost treated as a governance signal

Requests route on task type, prompt size, policy and cost budget — and the cost comparison itself is published with its asymmetries visible: what is priced from public lists, what awaits a measured run, what is excluded.

02 — The routing pipeline

One fixed order of evaluation, from prompt safety to dispatch

Stages 1 to 7 are decided locally, on the device, before anything may leave it. Requests are normalised — schemas, token accounting, safety settings, error classes — before traffic reaches any downstream provider.

01Prompt safety check

Always run, on the normalised payload.

02Context optimization

Optional. Large tool or file output is analysed locally; only a compact result travels.

03Complexity & capability scoring

A 6-D skill space plus the preference knob r, biasing cost (−1) to quality (+1).

04Pool filtering

Disabled and unavailable models are removed, with exclusion reasons recorded.

05Sensitive Sources screening

A match restricts the pool to local models.

06Model selection

CapabilitySpace or Hybrid routing mode, per active profile.

07Cloud Privacy Hardening

Only if the request is still cloud-bound. Off, Advisory or Enforced.

08Dispatch

Local GGUF, on-device NPU, loopback server or cloud API.

09Streamed response

Per-request telemetry written to local JSONL — sealed when encryption is on.

STAGES 1–7

are evaluated on the device. The original prompt drives intent classification, the composed egress payload drives locality screening, and a separate transformed artifact is what actually leaves.

03 — Deployment

From one machine to a governed estate

Three deployment modes — Standalone, Client, Server — control where the routing pipeline executes. Six documented scenarios follow the natural adoption path.

04 — Privacy, security and governance

Controls that hold before, during and after the request

Sensitive Sources

Files are indexed locally — keyword index for text formats, local text extraction for PDF — and the composed egress payload is screened, not just the typed prompt. TriggerBased allows cloud until a match restricts the pool; TopicBoundary keeps matches above an advisory threshold local unless egress is explicitly acknowledged.

Cloud Privacy Hardening

Local minimisation with a persistent pseudonym vault, Standard or Strong identifier detection, and Off / Soft / Strict compartmentalisation. Provider privacy tiers — Trusted, Standard, Restricted — bind stricter modes to riskier providers.

OffUnchanged behaviour, no minimisation.
AdvisoryMinimised preview computed, findings shown, composed payload still sent.
EnforcedOnly the minimised artifact leaves; residual risk falls back to a local model.

At-rest encryption

Opt-in AES-256-GCM envelopes over conversations, settings, the pseudonym vault, the Sensitive Sources index, logs and telemetry. One machine-bound Master Key wraps per-category content keys; Windows Hello gates a DPAPI unwrap and decrypts nothing itself. Encrypted full-bundle export moves an install to another machine; the Server and worker listeners stay down until unlock.

Workspaces and audit trail

Named workspaces isolate conversations, settings, vault, sources, telemetry, logs and a per-workspace audit log on one PC — client A from client B, work from personal. Create, switch, rename and soft-delete are journalled; the audit log filters by date, action and resource and exports to CSV or JSON.

Enterprise sign-in and RBAC

OIDC DEVICE CODE · IDP-AGNOSTIC · v4.0.1

Two independent gates sit in front of every session: unlock at-rest encryption, then sign in. Unlock is deliberately not an Admin privilege. Per-workspace memberships use an email allowlist with no SMTP, the first successful sign-in bootstraps Admin across pre-existing workspaces, and service-layer authorization is authoritative — the UI only hides dead ends.

Admin

Members, workspace lifecycle, security settings, Sensitive Sources, vault admin, backup and encryption lifecycle, audit view and export.

Editor

Create and send, delete own conversations, vault runtime write during chat.

Viewer

Read conversations; Send and Close are disabled up front, never enabled-then-denied.

Auditor

Audit log view and export, no chat send.

05 — Profiles and observability

A knob, four seeded profiles, and metrics that explain the choice

Offline-only
CapabilitySpace · r = −0.2

Prefer NPU, aggressive context optimization.

Low-cost
CapabilitySpace · r = −0.85

Prefer NPU and caching, aggressive context optimization, Cloud Privacy Hardening off.

Secure-review
Hybrid · r = 0.25

Aggressive context optimization with Cloud Privacy Hardening enforced.

High-quality
CapabilitySpace · r = 0.85

Stronger coverage preferred, higher context-optimization threshold, on-device SLM only for trivial pre-analysis.

What the router records about itself

Route-exact — the dispatched model is the cheapest-correct model.
Selected-answer — the dispatched model solves the prompt.
ctxSavingsRatio — optimized bytes against raw context bytes.
admissibleModelIds — the pool at selection time, with exclusion reasons: locality, disabled, hardware-unavailable, provider-disabled, experimental-runtime-inactive, workload-intensity.

Live latency, tokens, cost, cache behaviour, open-weight against cloud share, CPU/GPU/NPU device mix and context savings all surface on the Metrics page, next to the active preference-knob indicator.

Cost benchmark harness

A reproducible harness for cost-per-completed-task comparison: a fixed set of 16 prompts across 4 categories, a manual quality rubric, cited provider price lists, NPU amortisation assumptions and an NDJSON-aware live runner.

Stated openly

Live measured comparative results are still pending an operator run. Empty cells are not wins, and they are not "$0 local".

06 — What is not claimed

The boundaries, stated plainly rather than discovered in production

Every commitment above is documented in the handbook chapter that also carries its limits. These are the limits.

In-app roles are not OS isolation

Anyone with the same Windows profile, or raw access to the data folder, can read local files.

Audit logs are not tamper-evident

Workspace and identity logs detect corruption on read. That is not a hash chain and not cryptographic verification.

Retention closes one store, not both

The twelve-month window covers the identity audit log. Pending-invite emails in the memberships store still hold plaintext addresses with no retention policy, deferred to a later release.

No automatic re-lock, no manual lock

Once unlocked, data stays reachable in memory until the application closes, and a memory dump on that running process can expose the Master Key.

Worker dispatch is local-network egress

Sensitive Sources applies before every worker POST. Cloud Privacy Hardening does not apply to workers.

Platform boundaries

HTTPS still needs a manual netsh SSL binding by an administrator. ARM64 builds force GGUF inference to CPU; CUDA is x64 only. The experimental GPU on-device path ships off by default. Full-text context indexing is unavailable while encryption is on.

Bring the routing decision inside your perimeter.

Wardrail targets engineers and technical operators who already run at least one model and want a second tier — then internal servers, then governed cloud. Ask for the deployment handbook, a walkthrough of your target scenario, or an evaluation build.

At a glance
PlatformWinUI 3 desktop, x64 and ARM64
PoolGGUF / Ollama, on-device NPU, cloud APIs
ModesStandalone · Client · Server
TransportHTTPS + NDJSON streaming, internal network
Versionv4.0.1 · August 2026